Reforming Enterprise Architecture: A White Paper on Coherency Management and Strategic Integration

Core Concepts and Scholarly Perspectives of Enterprise Architecture

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This document is utilizing content that is generated by AI (GenAI) and utilizes the master thesis (Report) which was written by Peter Flemming Teunissen Sjoelin in 2011, but reference other sources as well, and these are declared in the “References” section of the paper. The document is licensed under Creative Commons Share Alike and Attribution (CC-SA-BY). The person to credit is Peter Flemming Teunissen Sjoelin (2026).

The Strategic Convergence of Strategy, Business, and Technology

Modern corporate environments are characterized by escalating operational complexity, driven by geographic expansion, product diversification, and structural maturation (Sjoelin 2011, p. 5).1 As organizations expand, the alignment of operational execution with executive intent becomes severely compromised, leading to fragmented decision-making and redundant resource allocation (Sjoelin 2011, p. 5).1 To address these structural failures, enterprise architecture has emerged as a critical management discipline. Rather than functioning purely as an information technology planning tool, modern enterprise architecture serves as an overarching governance mechanism that unifies strategic objectives with business operations and technological infrastructure (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1

The primary conceptual basis of this convergence is articulated by Scott Bernard, who outlines that enterprise architecture must extend beyond technical design by placing corporate strategy as its primary driver (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1 Bernard formalizes this integration by stating:

“EA extends beyond technology planning, by adding strategic planning as the primary driver of the enterprise, and business planning as the source of most program and resource requirements […] This is why I say that in its simplest form, the idea of Enterprise Architecture is that of the integrating strategy, business and technology ” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1

Within this formulation, enterprise architecture () is defined as the seamless mathematical and functional integration of corporate strategy (), business planning (), and technology infrastructure () (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1 This structural configuration provides executives with an actionable, coordinated view of the organization’s strategic direction, business capabilities, information flows, and resource utilization (Sjoelin 2011, p. 13).1 By documenting the current “As-Is” state, outlining the future “To-Be” state, and establishing a clear transition plan, enterprise architecture functions as both a management program and a systematic documentation method (Sjoelin 2011, p. 13).1 As Bernard further notes:

“As a practice, EA is both a management program and a documentation method that together provides an actionable, coordinated view of an enterprise’s strategic direction, business services, information flows, and resource utilization” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 13).1

The broader implication of this perspective is that utilizing enterprise architecture effectively requires organizations to transition from a technical design paradigm to an active, governance-centric operating model.2

Paradigm Shift in Architectural Definitions

The evolution of enterprise architecture has generated diverse definitions, reflecting distinct operational focuses and theoretical lineages (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1 These range from strictly technical infrastructure models to holistic enterprise design systems (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1 To construct a comprehensive understanding of how enterprise architecture can be utilized, it is necessary to examine these foundational definitions.

Theorist / SourceYearKey Definition and Direct QuotesSchool / Classification
Bernard (Sjoelin 2011, pp. 12-13) 12005Integrating strategy, business, and technology ; acts as “both a management program and a documentation method.”Enterprise Engineering School
Op’t Land et al. (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12) 12009“A coherent set of descriptions, covering a regulations-oriented, design-oriented and patterns-oriented perspective on an enterprise, which provides indicators and controls that enable the informed governance of the enterprise’s evolution and success.”Enterprise Engineering School
Ross & Weill (Sjoelin 2011, p. 13) 12006“The enterprise architecture is the organizing logic for business processes and IT infrastructure, reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the company’s operating model.”Enterprise Engineering School
Session (Sjoelin 2011, p. 14) 12008“An enterprise architecture is a description of the goals of an organization, how these goals are realized by business processes, and how these business processes can be better served through technology.”Enterprise Engineering School
van den Berg et al. (Sjoelin 2011, p. 14) 12005“The consistent set of rules and models that guide the design and implementation of processes…” Advocates a minimalist approach: “Do not develop more organization than your organization needs.”Enterprise Engineering School
Hoogervorst (Sjoelin 2011, p. 14) 12009“Enterprise architecture: a coherent and consistent set of principles and standards that guides enterprise design.”Enterprise Engineering School
The Open Group (Sjoelin 2011, p. 15) 12009“Architecture has two meanings depending on the context: (1) a formal description of a system… and (2) the structure of components, their interrelationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution…”Process School
Graves (Sjoelin 2011, p. 15) 12008“Enterprise-architecture is the integration of everything the enterprise is and does.” Emphasizes looking beyond IT to the structural wholeness of the corporate ecosystem.Hybrid School
Doucet et al. (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16) 12009“Enterprise Architecture is the inherent design and management approach essential for organizational coherence leading to alignment, agility and assurance.”Enterprise Engineering School
Sjoelin (Sjoelin 2011, p. 21) 12011“Enterprise Architecture is a set of principles, standards and methods for achieving informed governance… The alignment will enable enterprise governance and agility for adaption and assurance.”Hybrid School

By synthesizing these diverse perspectives, Sjoelin (2011, p. 21) 1 establishes a holistic definition that positions enterprise architecture as a framework for achieving informed governance. This definition shifts the focus from static, descriptive models to active, adaptive governance, laying the groundwork for Coherency Management (Sjoelin 2011, p. 21).1

As defined by Sjoelin (2011, p. 22) 1, Coherency Management is the process of cultivating enterprise architecture to redefine organizational, leadership, and knowledge practices in pursuit of competitive advantage. Under this paradigm, enterprise architecture serves as the operational engine that translates executive strategy into cohesive organizational behavior, driving systemic agility, strategic alignment, and operational assurance (Sjoelin 2011, p. 22).1 As

Doucet et al. outline:

“The concept of Coherency Management is about using Enterprise Architecture (EA) to advance alignment, agility and assurance in large, complex organizations. The essence of this concept is is that the architecture (words and pictures) of enterprises should become consistently structured, formalized, used to attain coherency.” (Sjoelin 2011, pp. 21-22).1

The Schools of Architecture and the Shift Beyond IT-Centricity

Process, Engineering, and Hybrid Paradigms

The professional enterprise architecture community is historically segmented into distinct philosophical schools (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16).1 These schools diverge on the primary mechanisms of architectural delivery, with some emphasizing rigid process lifecycles and others championing engineered structural models (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16).1 In his dialogue with the author, John Gøtze notes that:

“The Zachmanian paradigm is the idea about that it is possible to architect the enterprise… as it is defined in the Coherency Management book then it is clear that it is a part of the enterprise engineering concept and a part of the Zachmanian paradigm. Zachman wrote the forward to the book” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 17).1

Conversely, the process school—epitomized by The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF)—focuses on established execution methodologies (Sjoelin 2011, p. 15, 17).1 As Gøtze further explains:

“Enterprise Architecture is about having the right processes for how we do architecture and you can say that OIO-EA is in that paradigm.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 17).1

The historical tension between these schools often limits their organizational utility (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16).1 While the enterprise engineering school excels at maintaining structural integrity and strategic standards, it frequently lacks the tactical project management frameworks necessary to implement physical systems (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16).1 Conversely, the process school maintains robust project methodologies but risks descending into disjointed project execution without an overarching blueprint (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16).1 The hybrid school seeks to resolve this impasse by recognizing that successful architectural practice requires both the systematic blueprinting of the organization and flexible project execution frameworks (Sjoelin 2011, p. 16-17).1

The Evolution from Systems Design to Enterprise Coherency

A critical barrier to utilizing enterprise architecture effectively is the persistent misconception that the discipline is a technical function of the IT department (Sjoelin 2011, p. 17, 65).1 Historically, organizations have utilized enterprise architecture to build better technical systems rather than better enterprises.3 This IT-centric paradigm restricts the architectural team to technical infrastructure mapping, leaving business processes and corporate strategy disconnected (Sjoelin 2011, p. 17, 65).1

To transcend this limitation, organizations must shift towards Coherency Management, adopting enterprise architecture as an ongoing, overarching method for abstracting, analyzing, and designing the entire enterprise.2 This transition is essential due to the accelerating rate of market change (Sjoelin 2011, p. 18).1 As Doucet et al. observe:

“During the period new information systems took 3 to 7 years to develop and implement. IT assets such as mainframes and COTS were often amortized over 5 to 7 years and even longer. Today, if you ask the CEOs and Boards of many our clients how fast they would want a major change implemented in their core processes, a new partner relationship implemented, a recent acquisition’s products and customers integrated, most will reply ‘yesterday’.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 18).1

When enterprise architecture is confined to an IT-centric silo, the strategic agility of the organization is severely compromised (Sjoelin 2011, p. 17-18).1 Transcendence requires that business leaders actively sponsor and co-own the enterprise architecture program.4 By integrating business architecture with technical capability mapping, the organization can transition from rigid systems design to a dynamic, coherency-driven operating model capable of immediate adaptation to competitive pressures (Sjoelin 2011, p. 18, 22).1

Socio-Technical Dynamics: Bricolage, Hacking, and Loosely Coupled Systems

Claudio Ciborra and the Reality of Socio-Technical Systems

A foundational error in traditional enterprise architecture practices is the assumption of absolute structural rationality, where human actors are expected to conform flawlessly to centralized blueprints.5 Claudio Ciborra challenges this orthodox perspective by examining the socio-technical reality of information systems (Sjoelin 2011, p. 29).1 Ciborra argues that information systems represent complex socio-technical hybrids that cannot be classified purely under natural sciences:

“The IS discipline, being hybrid and dealing with socio-technical hybrids, is hard to classify as a natural or a human science. The very definition of information systems as a set of technical (scientific) and human resources devoted to the management of information in organizations spells out the composite nature of the field” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 29).1

Ciborra emphasizes that real-world organizations operate in a “life world” characterized by vagueness, unpredictability, and imperfection (Sjoelin 2011, p. 29).1 As he warns:

“We live and operate in a life world that has vague and murky contours, we might not like it, but this every day reality, with all of its imperfections and unpredictability, is real, while outcomes of abstraction and mathematization that are ideal.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 29).1

Consequently, managers who attempt to enforce rigid, blueprinted systems without accounting for human agency and local context frequently induce organizational resistance and systemic failure (Sjoelin 2011, p. 29-30).1 Ciborra highlights that the actual success of the information systems discipline is sustained by:

“the strategic importance of ordinary modes of operation, such as bricolage, heuristics, serendipity, make-do, rather than the idealities of methods” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 29).1

Bricolage, Hacking, and the Limits of Blueprinted Rationality

To survive within this unpredictable reality, organizational actors routinely engage in localized adaptation, which Ciborra conceptualizes through the terms bricolage and hacking (Sjoelin 2011, p. 30-31).1 Ciborra defines bricolage as “tinkering through the combination of resources at hand” wherein “the practices and the situations disclose new users and applications of the technology and the things” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31).1

In technical environments, this tinkering manifests as hacking, which Ciborra defines as:

“in the jargon of computer practice, hacking is devising and implementing a program to a certain useful function, by making use of any technology in original, unorthodox, and often playful way.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31).1

Hacking and bricolage represent highly situated, localized activities that exploit immediate context and resources to overcome rigid organizational barriers (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31).1 Traditional management paradigms view these practices as subversive activities that must be eliminated in the name of standardization (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31).1

However, an advanced enterprise architecture strategy recognizes that bricolage and hacking are critical drivers of organizational agility (Sjoelin 2011, p. 30-31).1 Rather than attempting to suppress these localized innovations, the chief architect must utilize enterprise architecture to establish a structured playground that guides, rather than stifles, situational adaptation (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31-32).1

This approach leverages the local context while ensuring that ad hoc solutions do not compromise the integrity of the broader corporate infrastructure (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31-32).1

Loose Couplings and Organizational Fragmentation

The socio-technical complexity of utilizing enterprise architecture is further illuminated by Orton and Weick’s conceptualization of loosely coupled systems (Sjoelin 2011, p. 37).1 Organizations are not monolithic, highly integrated machines; rather, they are fragmented structures consisting of loosely coupled individuals, sub-units, and hierarchical levels (Sjoelin 2011, p. 37).1 This fragmentation is driven by a lack of clear means-ends connections and highly diverse external environments (Sjoelin 2011, p. 37).1

Loose coupling is highly advantageous, providing organizations with localized adaptability, behavioral autonomy, and systemic persistence in the face of localized disruptions (Sjoelin 2011, p. 37).1 However, this fragmentation presents severe challenges for corporate-wide change initiatives (Sjoelin 2011, p. 37).1 When an enterprise architecture team attempts to enforce global standards across loosely coupled units, the implementation often experiences friction, resulting in strategic drift or superficial compliance (Sjoelin 2011, p. 37).1

To balance these dynamics, the architecture team must utilize communities of practice, defined by Wenger (1998) as informal, voluntary groups of individuals collaborating around shared practical challenges (Sjoelin 2011, p. 34).1 As Wenger outlines, practice encompasses both explicit codified rules and tacit, unsaid cultural assumptions:

“Such a concept of practice includes both the explicit and the tacit. It includes what is said and what is left unsaid; what is represented and what is assumed. It includes the language, tools, documents, images, symbols well-defined roles, specified criteria, codified procedures, regulations, and contracts that various practices make explicit for a variety of purposes.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 34).1

Rather than relying solely on a codification strategy—which attempts to force all knowledge into electronic repositories—architects must also employ a personalization strategy (Sjoelin 2011, p. 35).1 This personalization approach rewards direct knowledge sharing and cultivates communities of practice across loosely coupled silos, ensuring that centralized standards are interpreted and adopted in a contextually appropriate manner (Sjoelin 2011, p. 35-36).1

The Extended IGIA-Framework: Structural Phases and Implementation Processes

Environmental Pressures and the Initial Catalyst

To bridge the gap between theoretical architectural design and operational execution, Sjoelin utilizes the Integrated Governance Implementation Approach (IGIA) framework, extending it to address corporate strategy, enterprise governance, and mergers and acquisitions (Sjoelin 2011, p. 43, 57).1 The Extended IGIA-framework operates as a continuous, cyclic model driven by external and internal environmental pressures (Sjoelin 2011, p. 43, 49).1

This dynamic is structured upon a sequential change management methodology designed to systematically move the enterprise through successive operational states (Sjoelin 2011, p. 39).1

Phase / StepCore Change Management ObjectiveTactical Implementation ActivitiesAssociated Theoretical Concepts
Step 1 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 39) 1Articulate strategic plans (corporate, IT, financial) and identify operational social networks.Define objectives to move from As-Is to To-Be; identify key communicators within the informal network.Corporate Strategy; Social Network Theory
Step 2 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 39) 1Establish broad consensus and establish a shared psychological necessity for change.Execute interactive workshops, conferences, executive broadcasts, and supplier integration sessions.Change Urgency (Kotter); Communication Strategy
Step 3 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 39) 1Coordinate project deployment across middle management to bypass structural inertia.Partner with line managers to translate executive directives into daily department activities.Middle Management Engagement; Loose Couplings
Step 4 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 39) 1Enforce organizational restructuring and secure individual adaptation to new workflows.Redefine operational structures, redeploy personnel, and provide transitional training.Organizational Design; Adaptive Social Systems

This structured sequence corresponds directly with Kotter’s eight-step change management model, which asserts that corporate transformations fail unless they begin by establishing a profound sense of urgency (Sjoelin 2011, p. 38).1 Under the Extended IGIA-framework, external market disruptions or internal operational failures are utilized to construct a “burning platform” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 50).1 This burning platform establishes the necessary strategic momentum to overcome structural inertia and secure the executive buy-in required to launch the enterprise architecture program (Sjoelin 2011, p. 50).1

Architectural Mapping and Pre-Merger Due Diligence

Following the establishment of the burning platform, the framework initiates Phase 1 (Tactical Grounding) and Phase 2 (M&A Architecture) (Sjoelin 2011, p. 50-51).1 Phase 1 requires the rapid mobilization of an enterprise architecture group led by a chief architect (Sjoelin 2011, p. 50).1 This team must immediately estimate the quantitative and qualitative value of the architectural program to maintain executive commitment (Sjoelin 2011, p. 50).1

The chief architect must design and adapt the architectural framework to the unique socio-technical characteristics of the enterprise (Sjoelin 2011, p. 50-51).1 This adaptation involves identifying the overarching corporate strategy and mapping business operations and existing corporate technology (Sjoelin 2011, p. 51).1 By doing so, the team uncovers how the enterprise currently creates value and where its technological constraints lie (Sjoelin 2011, p. 51).1

In corporate merger situations, Phase 2 (M&A Architecture) becomes critical (Sjoelin 2011, p. 51).1 Traditional corporate due diligence focuses exclusively on legal, financial, and product portfolio analysis, often ignoring the target’s underlying operational and technological architecture (Sjoelin 2011, p. 41).1 The Extended IGIA-framework introduces systematic architectural due diligence (Sjoelin 2011, p. 51).1 Architects are deployed to identify potential merger partners, map their architectural ontology, and model their existing business processes and data systems (Sjoelin 2011, p. 41, 51).1

This pre-merger mapping allows the acquiring enterprise to systematically evaluate architectural compatibility, identify potential integration bottlenecks, and articulate an accurate plan for structural and technological change before final contracts are executed (Sjoelin 2011, p. 51-52).1 As Henningsson notes on the strategic necessity of synergistic integration in mergers and acquisitions:

“The concept of synergy is fundamental to understanding the rational reasons as to why companies participate in merger activities, as synergies in this context are defined as to what is occurring when two units can be run more efficiently and / or more effectively together than apart” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 40).1

Execution, Restructuring, and Post-Execution Program Planning

The final operational components of the framework are Phase 3 (Execution) and Phase 4 (Post-Execution and Evaluation) (Sjoelin 2011, p. 52-55).1

Phase 3 (Execution) unifies corporate governance, IT strategy, and workforce planning to initiate the structural merger of the two enterprises (Sjoelin 2011, p. 52, 57).1 The corporate strategies are unified, and organizational restructuring is executed to align roles, tasks, and departmental cultures (Sjoelin 2011, p. 52, 57).1 Crucially, the unified architectural state must be systematically documented in a centralized repository to prevent architectural drift and maintain institutional knowledge (Sjoelin 2011, p. 52).1

Phase 4 (Post-Execution) addresses the inevitable socio-technical anomalies that occur during large-scale integration (Sjoelin 2011, p. 52).1 This phase is structured as an ongoing, cyclic program planning and evaluation loop (Sjoelin 2011, p. 53-55).1

Extended IGIA PhaseOperational ObjectiveTactical Execution ActivitiesAnalytical Tools Utilized
Program Planning (Sjoelin 2011, p. 53) 1Identify post-execution anomalies and develop structured ad hoc solutions.Collect operational data, analyze system gaps, and establish scenarios for adaptive change.Bricolage and Tinkering; Gap Analysis
Implementation Planning (Sjoelin 2011, p. 53-54) 1Execute tactical solutions while actively managing human and cultural factors.Communicate strategic intent, engage informal networks, and prioritize prioritized change projects.Change Communication; Social Network Dynamics
Buy-in & Evaluation (Sjoelin 2011, p. 54-55) 1Measure change impact, assess team adaptation, and validate business case realizations.Conduct post-implementation reviews, evaluate financial returns, and test future strategic scenarios.Strategic Control; Benefits Realization
Investment Planning (Sjoelin 2011, p. 55-57) 1Allocate corporate resources and plan future architectural iterations.Execute financial cost-benefit analyses and approve future modernization projects.Capital Allocation; Strategic Alignment

This continuous, four-step feedback mechanism ensures that the enterprise architecture program remains aligned with corporate reality, allowing the organization to learn from integration challenges and refine its investment strategies in subsequent iterations (Sjoelin 2011, p. 53-57).1

Enterprise Architecture in Mergers and Acquisitions: Lessons from the Financial Sector

The Danske Bank Group Case: “One Group, One System”

To evaluate the operational utility of these theoretical frameworks, the case of the Danske Bank Group (DBG) provides an instructive analysis (Sjoelin 2011, p. 23).1 Operating as a highly digitalized, divisionally structured multinational financial enterprise, DBG historically credited its centralized information systems platform for delivering a sustainable technological lead over its competitors (Sjoelin 2011, p. 23).1

For more than fifteen years, DBG’s corporate strategy was governed by the uncompromising operational motto: “One Group, One System” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 24).1 This IT strategy dictated that the entire global group must operate on a single, standardized IT platform managed centrally in Denmark (Sjoelin 2011, p. 23-24).1 Consequently, whenever DBG acquired a foreign bank, the target’s existing IT infrastructure and local platforms were summarily decommissioned and replaced with DBG’s proprietary systems portfolio (Sjoelin 2011, p. 24, 70).1

To sustain this massive technological monoculture, DBG allocated immense capital to IT operations, spending 4.142 billion DKK in 2010 alone, which represented a substantial operational commitment (Sjoelin 2011, p. 25).1 This strategic position is mathematically modeled through the IT cost ratio:

This significant financial investment was supported by a massive global sourcing alliance, including an offshore development center in Bangalore, India, employing over 400 specialized engineers (Sjoelin 2011, p. 25).1 Historically, DBG utilized this highly centralized platform to aggressively execute a series of corporate acquisitions across Northern Europe (Sjoelin 2011, p. 23-26).1

Acquisition YearAcquired Target EntityPrimary Geographical MarketIntegration Methodology Applied
1990 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1Handelsbanken, Provinsbanken, Den Danske BankDenmark (Domestic Market)Unified under the Den Danske Bank brand, establishing the core centralized bank platform.
1995 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1Danica PensionDenmark (Domestic Market)Standardized financial administrative processes across insurance and retail operations.
1997 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1Östgöta Enskilda BankSweden (International Expansion)Migrated localized Swedish retail banking processes to the unified Danish systems portfolio.
1999 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1Fokus BankNorway (International Expansion)Decommissioned Norwegian data systems, integrating retail operations into the centralized Danish platform.
2001 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1Realkredit DanmarkDenmark (Domestic Market)Integrated domestic mortgage and lending systems with core retail banking operations.
2005 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1National Irish Bank & Northern BankIreland and United Kingdom (M&A)Conducted complete infrastructure replacements, decommissioning highly obsolete legacy systems.
2007 (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26) 1Sampo BankFinland and Baltic States (M&A)Forced migration of an advanced, mature local system to the central Danish platform, creating severe friction.

This historical record demonstrates that DBG possessed extensive experience in absorbing external financial institutions (Sjoelin 2011, p. 26).1 However, DBG’s rigid architectural approach generated highly divergent socio-technical outcomes depending on the technological maturity of the acquired banks (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71-74).1

Comparative Socio-Technical Failures and Successes: Northern Bank versus Sampo Bank

The limits of a dogmatic, centralized “One Group, One System” architectural strategy are illuminated by comparing the integration of Northern Bank in Northern Ireland with that of Sampo Bank in Finland (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71-74).1

In the case of Northern Bank, the target institution was technologically obsolete, operating far behind contemporary standards (Sjoelin 2011, p. 72).1 The legacy owners had failed to invest in systems modernization for over twelve years, resulting in low technological competency among the workforce (Sjoelin 2011, p. 72).1 As the VP of IT recalled:

“In the Northern Bank case, the primary problem with IT was that they where not the same level as the Danske Bank Group was. They where not mature enough to be hooked up on the Danske Bank Group. They where almost back in the pen & paper era, and that would say that they didn’t have the necessary IT competence to use the systems that the Danske Bank Group could provide for them.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 72).1

When DBG executed the merger, they summarily replaced the entire hardware and software infrastructure of the bank (Sjoelin 2011, p. 72).1 The employee base perceived this aggressive modernization as an investment in their future, embracing the change despite severe initial friction (Sjoelin 2011, p. 72-73).1 Although it took the workforce over a year to fully adapt, the transition was deemed a major strategic success because DBG’s platform represented a significant upgrade, boosting operational capabilities (Sjoelin 2011, p. 73).1

A highly contrasting outcome occurred during the integration of Sampo Bank in Finland (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71, 74).1 Unlike the Irish acquisition, Sampo Bank was highly sophisticated, possessing an IT platform that was at least as mature as DBG’s, and in several areas (such as digital home banking) technologically superior (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71, 74).1 In alignment with their strict IT strategy, DBG managers dismantled Sampo’s advanced local systems, forcing Finnish employees and customers to migrate to DBG’s standardized platform (Sjoelin 2011, p. 24, 71, 74).1

Because the standardized platform lacked several advanced features of the native Finnish systems, users experienced the migration as a significant “step backwards” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71, 74).1 As the VP of IT detailed:

“When we acquired the Finnish bank a lot of people said there are many good features in their systems that we didn’t have in ours, and that would say that the users would experience a step backwards when the systems would be converted to our central platform. That was a challenge to tell people that they in fact would save hundreds of millions of kroner by applying one platform, and you will have access to all the features that are developed by the central IT department of the Danske Bank Group for free.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71).1

This technical regression triggered severe socio-technical friction (Sjoelin 2011, p. 74).1 Finnish employees and managers rejected the new platforms and actively criticized DBG’s systems, igniting a wave of nationalistic resentment against “some Danes” taking over their 150-year-old patriotic institution (Sjoelin 2011, p. 74).1 The resulting operational turmoil led to severe negative press and customer churn, forcing DBG to spend millions of DKK retrofitting their global platform to incorporate the very features they had just decommissioned (Sjoelin 2011, p. 74, 76).1

This comparative failure reveals a profound blind spot in DBG’s centralized strategy (Sjoelin 2011, p. 74, 76).1 By utilizing a rigid, one-size-fits-all architectural approach, DBG optimized for technical consolidation costs while completely ignoring the social, psychological, and capability-driven dimensions of the integration (Sjoelin 2011, p. 74, 76).1

Integrating Architectural Due Diligence to Minimize Strategic Friction

The contrasting integrations of Northern Bank and Sampo Bank demonstrate that utilizing enterprise architecture solely as a post-acquisition consolidation tool is highly risky (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71-74, 78).1 To minimize strategic friction and protect organizational value, enterprise architecture must be actively integrated into the pre-purchase due diligence phase (Sjoelin 2011, p. 41, 78, 83).1

Historically, DBG’s due diligence teams visited potential merger partners to examine credit portfolios, local laws, and customer demographics, but ignored the target’s underlying IT architecture (Sjoelin 2011, p. 70, 78).1 As the VP of IT admitted:

“Our approach is to deal with how to convert their IT onto our platform. We don’t investigate how their IT systems work, that we really don’t care about.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 70).1

This omission prevented DBG from anticipating the massive integration challenges and employee resistance encountered in Finland (Sjoelin 2011, p. 74, 78).1

By deploying enterprise architects during pre-merger due diligence, the acquiring organization can systematically map the target’s architectural ontology and system dependencies (Sjoelin 2011, p. 41, 83-84).1 This structural mapping enables the organization to categorize the target’s architectural maturity and execute a differentiated integration strategy (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71, 83-84).1

When the target has low operational maturity, a rapid, centralized migration is appropriate (Sjoelin 2011, p. 72-73).1 However, when the target possesses high architectural maturity, the acquiring firm must employ a hybrid, personalized approach (Sjoelin 2011, p. 35, 74).1 This approach involves preserving superior local systems or back-porting them to the global platform via structured bricolage, protecting localized capabilities and minimizing socio-technical resistance (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31, 74).1

Governance and Strategic Alignment: Building the To-Be Architecture

Modern Tooling and the Transition from Static Slide Decks to Active Repositories

To transition an organization from an IT-centric architectural state to a mature, enterprise-wide coherency model, the executive team must reform how architectural knowledge is documented and accessed (Sjoelin 2011, p. 47-49, 66).1 Sjoelin (2011, p. 66) 1 reveals that DBG’s enterprise architecture program suffered from a severe lack of documented artifacts:

“There are three perspectives of EA: The artifact perspective to have some basic tools, documents, or other things that can work as a map or standard that needed to coordinate across the enterprise, it has to be written down… The 2nd perspective is the governance perspective and the third perspective is the organizational perspective. I believe that Danske Bank Group have been fighting the artifact part of the Enterprise Architecture program. We haven’t had tradition for identifying and articulating the artifacts, and as such the program has been focusing more on the governance part where it has been rather dependable on the persons.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 66).1

This reliance on personal networks meant that DBG’s architectural overview was concentrated in the heads of only two or three long-tenured executives (Sjoelin 2011, p. 66).1 When critical personnel leave or retire, this institutional knowledge vanishes, severely exposing the organization to operational risk (Sjoelin 2011, p. 35, 66).1

To resolve this vulnerability, modern enterprise architecture management (EAM) practices require a transition from static documentation tools—such as Visio diagrams, Excel spreadsheets, and PowerPoint slide decks—to active, cloud-driven repositories.6 Static tools are fundamentally incapable of modeling the dynamic, multi-layered dependencies of complex corporate ecosystems.6

By deploying a modern, cloud-driven EAM platform, the organization can establish a centralized, machine-readable repository that automatically aggregates data from across corporate silos.6 This repository-driven architecture democratizes architectural data, providing executives with real-time, interactive visualizations of application portfolios, business capabilities, and technology lifecycles.6 This democratization is essential to establish “informed governance,” enabling business leaders to make capital allocation decisions based on accurate data rather than subjective personal assessments (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12, 66, 92).1

Structuring Decentralized Architectural Boards

The chief architect of DBG sought to operationalize this repository-driven transition by implementing a decentralized architectural model (Sjoelin 2011, p. 24, 66-67).1 This model addresses the core physical limitations of centralized EA teams (Sjoelin 2011, p. 67).1 A small central architecture group lacks the resources to oversee hundreds of concurrent projects across a multinational enterprise (Sjoelin 2011, p. 67).1 To scale the architectural practice, DBG established decentralized “Portfolio Architects” embedded directly within the seven core development departments of the bank (Sjoelin 2011, p. 25, 67).1 As the Chief Architect detailed:

“A new role will be introduced from the 1st of January 2011. We will in the future have the role of the enterprise architect and the role of portfolio architect. We have about 2.000 developers in Danske Bank Group and we have about 100 to 150 projects a year, we [the enterprise architects] don’t have the resources run around in the enterprise to gain an overview of all of the projects, we will therefore try enforce that the portfolio architects will be in charge for managing architectural boards for each of the seven fields of development that are present in the Danske Bank Group. They will develop the architecture boards that will include principles, standards and reference architecture for their particular field. They would in turn report to the global enterprise architecture board that is responsible for coordination among them.” (Sjoelin 2011, p. 67).1

This decentralized governance model balances the organizational tension between centralized standardization and localized agility (Sjoelin 2011, p. 30, 67).1 While the central board maintains global architectural integrity, the local boards possess the domain-specific context required to facilitate localized bricolage and rapid system adaptation (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31, 67).1

To guide this operational transition, the chief architect must outline a clear, multi-dimensional roadmap to move the organization from its “As-Is” technical state to its unified “To-Be” coherency model (Sjoelin 2011, p. 13, 76, 79).1

Operational DimensionAs-Is Architectural State (IT-Centric Paradigm) (Sjoelin 2011, pp. 76-78)Target To-Be Architectural State (Embedded Coherency) (Sjoelin 2011, pp. 79-82)Primary Tooling Mechanism / Solution Enabler
Organizational PlacementSub-unit within the IT department; seen as a technical overhead by business leaders.Decentralized Portfolio Architects reporting to a global EA board; sponsored by executive leaders.Integrated Stakeholder Portals and dynamic, collaborative user interfaces.
Documentation PracticeLacks formal artifacts and structured repositories; relies on personal knowledge of select experts.Multi-layered, modular, and machine-readable enterprise repositories capturing tacit/explicit dynamics.Cloud-driven, automated data aggregation, replacing static Visio/PowerPoint documents.
M&A Due DiligenceIG/EA excluded from pre-merger due diligence; target IT ignored or summarily replaced.Architectural mapping of target’s ontology and systems prior to acquisition; pre-merger synergy testing.Dynamic Capability Mapping and automated target portfolio assessment.
Strategic Alignment“One Group, One System” enforced dogmatically, disregarding localized user capabilities.“Coherency Management” balancing central standards with localized socio-technical capabilities.Agile business transformation tracking and modular capability mapping.
Evaluation MechanicsFragmented project evaluations; no central repository of lessons learned.Centralized evaluation office tracking business case realization, portfolio health, and team execution.Real-time dashboards displaying application risk, cost optimization, and compliance metrics.

This multi-dimensional transition plan outlines that maturing an enterprise architecture program requires a simultaneous evolution of organizational structure, documentation tooling, pre-merger strategy, and governance mechanics (Sjoelin 2011, p. 79-82).1 By executing this comprehensive transition, the corporate executive team can evolve enterprise architecture from a narrow IT support function into a strategic capability that delivers organizational coherency and competitive advantage (Sjoelin 2011, p. 22, 92).1

To further strengthen this transition, the IT development process can be optimized through systematic integration tools that automate the collection and organization of architectural data.7 For example, platforms like CloverDX enable organizations to automate data collection, validation, and transformation across legacy silos, feeding consistent operational metrics into the centralized EAM repository.7 By integrating automated data pipeline tools with a modern EAM system, the enterprise architecture team can bypass manual documentation barriers, ensuring that the target “To-Be” architecture remains populated with real-time, high-fidelity operational data.6

Actionable Strategic Recommendations

Utilizing enterprise architecture to achieve integrated governance and strategic agility requires a departure from the traditional, IT-centric design paradigm (Sjoelin 2011, p. 17-18).1 Based on the theoretical synthesis of the Extended IGIA-framework and the socio-technical lessons derived from the Danske Bank Group case study, several critical recommendations are established for corporate leaders:

  • Sponsor and Co-Own the Architectural Practice: Executive leadership must transition the enterprise architecture program out of the IT department and place it under the direct sponsorship of the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12, 17, 82).1 Enterprise architecture must be utilized as a strategic management discipline that integrates corporate strategy, business processes, and technology infrastructure under a single operational model (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12).1
  • Evolve from Slide Decks to Active Repositories: Organizations must abandon static, disconnected planning tools such as PowerPoint, Excel, and Visio.6 To establish true informed governance, the enterprise must implement a modern, cloud-driven enterprise architecture management platform that automatically maintains a centralized, machine-readable repository of organizational capabilities and system dependencies (Sjoelin 2011, p. 12, 66).1
  • Balance Centralized Standards with Localized Bricolage: Rather than dogmatically enforcing an uncompromising technological monoculture, the global architectural board must establish flexible design parameters (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31-32, 67).1 Centralized standards must be utilized to maintain core infrastructure compliance, while decentralized business units are granted the behavioral autonomy to engage in localized tinkering and rapid, situated problem-solving (Sjoelin 2011, p. 31, 37).1
  • Integrate Architectural Due Diligence into M&A Operations: The due diligence teams must be systematically trained in enterprise architecture practices (Sjoelin 2011, p. 84, 94).1 Prior to executing acquisition contracts, architects must map the target’s underlying technological ontology and business capabilities (Sjoelin 2011, p. 41, 51).1 This pre-merger mapping must be utilized to guide a differentiated integration strategy that preserves and integrates high-maturity local systems, protecting organizational value and minimizing socio-technical friction (Sjoelin 2011, p. 71, 74, 83).1
  • Establish a Centralized Strategic Evaluation Unit: A specialized corporate department must be positioned close to the executive committee to evaluate the performance of all business and IT projects (Sjoelin 2011, p. 47, 82).1 This unit must compile post-implementation reviews and hold managers strictly accountable for the physical realization of the business cases used to justify strategic investments (Sjoelin 2011, p. 47, 80).1

By adopting these advanced architectural practices, contemporary enterprises can transition from fragmented, loosely coupled structures into unified, highly coherent organizations capable of rapid, data-driven transformation (Sjoelin 2011, p. 22, 37, 92).1 Utilizing enterprise architecture through the lens of Coherency Management ultimately ensures that strategic decisions are executed with absolute organizational alignment, operational agility, and corporate assurance (Sjoelin 2011, p. 22).1

References

  1. Sjoelin, P. F. T. (2011) Producibility an Industry Paradigm: Reforming the Approach to Enterprise Architecture and Systems Integration in M&A Situations  (Kandidatspeciale).
  2. Doucet, Gary & Gøtze, John & Saha, Pallab & Bernard, Scott. (2008). Coherency Management: Using Enterprise Architecture for Alignment, Agility, and Assurance. 4.  Doucet Coherency Management: Using Enterprise Architecture for Alignment, Agility, and Assurance | Request PDF – ResearchGate, accessed July 9, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/241756216_Coherency_Management_Using_Enterprise_Architecture_for_Alignment_Agility_and_Assurance
  3. Doucet, Gary & Gøtze, John & Saha, Pallab & Bernard, Scott. (2009) Coherency Management: Architecting the Enterprise for Alignment, Agility and Assurance, accessed July 9, 2026, https://pure.itu.dk/en/publications/coherency-management-architecting-the-enterprise-for-alignment-ag
  4. Sjoelin, P. F. T. (2010) The Foundation for Coherency Management:, accessed July 9, 2026, https://coherencyarchitect.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/009_embracing_coherency_management.pdf
  5. Finch, Matt. (2020) 7 magic words to challenge the wisdom of systems: getting your head around Claudio Ciborra’s Labyrinths of Information, accessed July 9, 2026, https://mechanicaldolphin.com/2020/11/18/7-magic-words-to-challenge-the-wisdom-of-systems-getting-your-head-around-claudio-ciborras-labyrinths-of-information/
  6. SAP AG. (N.D.) What is Enterprise Architecture? Framework & Process – SAP LeanIX, accessed July 9, 2026, https://www.leanix.net/en/wiki/ea/enterprise-architecture
  7. CloverDX. (N.D.) Your Guide To Enterprise Data Architecture White Paper – CloverDX, accessed July 9, 2026, https://www.cloverdx.com/gc/lp/white-paper/your-guide-to-enterprise-data-architecture